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Abstract. One of the main lines of research in functional encryption
(FE) has consisted in studying the security notions for FE and their
achievability. This study was initiated by [Boneh et al. – TCC’11, O’Neill
– ePrint’10] where it was first shown that for FE the indistinguishability-
based (IND) security notion is not sufficient in the sense that there are
FE schemes that are provably IND-Secure but concretely insecure. For
this reason, researchers investigated the achievability of Simulation-based
(SIM) security, a stronger notion of security. Unfortunately, the above-
mentioned works and others [e.g., Agrawal et al. – CRYPTO’13] have
shown strong impossibility results for SIM-Security. One way to overcome
these impossibility results was first suggested in the work of Boneh et
al. where it was shown how to construct, in the Random Oracle (RO)
model, SIM-Secure FE for restricted functionalities and was asked the
generalization to more complex functionalities as a challenging problem
in the area. Subsequently, [De Caro et al. – CRYPTO’13] proposed a
candidate construction of SIM-Secure FE for all circuits in the RO model
assuming the existence of an IND-Secure FE scheme for circuits with RO
gates. To our knowledge there are no proposed candidate IND-Secure
FE schemes for circuits with RO gates and they seem unlikely to exist.
We propose the first constructions of SIM-Secure FE schemes in the
RO model that overcome the current impossibility results in different
settings. We can do that because we resort to the two following models:
– In the public-key setting we assume a bound on the number of queries
but this bound only affects the running-times of our encryption
and decryption procedures. We stress that our FE schemes in this
model are SIM-Secure and have ciphertexts and tokens of constant-
size, whereas in the standard model, the current SIM-Secure FE
schemes for general functionalities [De Caro et al., Gorbunov et al.
– CRYPTO’12] have ciphertexts and tokens of size growing as the
number of queries.
– In the symmetric-key setting we assume a timestamp on both cipher-
texts and tokens. In this model, we provide FE schemes with short
ciphertexts and tokens that are SIM-Secure against adversaries ask-
ing an unbounded number of queries.
Both results also assume the RO model, but not functionalities with RO
gates and rely on extractability obfuscation [Boyle et al. – TCC’14] (and
other standard primitives) secure only in the standard model.
Keywords. Functional Encryption, Random Oracle Model, Simulation-
Based Security, Obfuscation.
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1 Introduction
The study of simulation-based (SIM) notions of security for functional
encryption were initiated only recently by Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [1]
and O’Neill [2]. Quite interestingly, they show there exists clearly insecure
FE schemes for certain functionalities that are nonetheless deemed secure
by IND-Security, whereas these schemes do not meet the stronger notion
of SIM-Security.
For this reason, researchers have started a further theoretical study
of FE that includes either negative results showing SIM-Security is not
always achievable [1, 3, 4] or alternative models overcoming the impos-
sibility results [5, 6]. On the positive direction, Boneh et al. [1] showed
the existence of SIM-Secure FE schemes in the Random Oracle (RO, in
short) [7] model for restricted functionalities (i.e., Attribute-based En-
cryption), and at the same time they left as a challenging problem the
construction of FE for more sophisticated functionalities that satisfy SIM-
Security in the RO model. More recently, De Caro et al. [8] showed how to
overcome all known impossibility results assuming the existence of IND-
Secure schemes for circuits with random oracle gates. This is a very strong
assumption for which we do not know any candidate scheme and their
existence seems unlikely.1
Furthermore, their scheme incurs the following theoretical problem.
First of all, recall that in a FE system for functionality F : K ×X → Σ,
defined over key space K, message space X and output space Σ, for every
key k ∈ K, the owner of the master secret key Msk associated with master
public key Pk can generate a secret key Tokk that allows the computation
of F (k, x) from a ciphertext of x computed under master public key Pk.
Thus, in a standard FE scheme the functionality is fixed in advance,
and the scheme should allow to compute over encrypted data accordingly
to this functionality. Instead, in the scheme for the RO model of De
Caro et al. [8], the functionality does depend on the RO, and thus, even
their implicit definition of functionality and FE scheme is not standard.
Therefore, their scheme is not satisfactory.
This leads to the main question that we study in this work:
Can we achieve standard FE schemes in the (conventional) Pro-
grammable RO model from reasonable assumptions?
Our results answer affirmatively to this question demonstrating the
existence of SIM-Secure schemes in the RO model with short parameters.
1 This issue was first noticed by several researchers [9] and personally communicated
by Jonathan Katz to the authors of the work [8].
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The impossibility result of [4] shows that in a SIM-Secure FE scheme, the
size of the ciphertexts has to grow as the number of token queries (see
also [10] and [5]). On the other hand, our results also provide schemes for
the RO model that are SIM-Secure but in which the size of the tokens
and the ciphertexts is constant.2 Before presenting our positive results in
more detail, we prefer to first sketch our techniques so to highlight the
technical problems that led to our constructions and models.
Our techniques. We recall (a simplified version of) the transformation
of De Caro et al. [8] to bootstrap an IND-Secure scheme for Boolean
circuits to a SIM-Secure scheme for the same functionality. For sake
of simplicity we focus on the non-adaptive setting, specifically on SIM-
Security against adversaries asking q non-adaptive queries.3 The idea of
their transformation is to replace the original circuit with a “trapdoor”
one that the simulator can use to program the output in some way. In
the transformed scheme, they put additional “slots” in the plaintexts and
secret keys that will only be used by the simulator. A plaintext has 2+2q
slots and a secret key will have one. In the plaintext, the first slot is the
actual message m and the second slot will be a bit flag indicating whether
the ciphertext is in trapdoor mode. and the last 2q slots will be q pairs
(ri, zi), where ri is a random string and zi is a programmed string. These
2q slots are used to handle q non-adaptive queries. On the other hand,
in a secret key for circuit C, the slot is a random string r, that will be
equal to one of the ri in the challenge ciphertext. For evaluation, if the
ciphertext is not in trapdoor mode (flag = 0) then the new circuit simply
evaluates the original circuit C of the message m. If the ciphertext is in
trapdoor mode, if r = ri for some i ∈ [q] then the transformed circuit
outputs zi.
A natural approach to shorten the size of the ciphertexts in the RO
model would be the following. Recall that a Multi-Input FE (MI-FE)
scheme [11–13] is a FE over multiple ciphertexts. Let our starting scheme
2 Specifically, in our main transformation the size of the tokens is constant if we
employ a collision-resistant hash function of variable-length, otherwise their size only
depends on the encoding of the value and thus can be sub-logarithmic. Similarly, for
the timestamp model of Section 3.3, both tokens and ciphertexts need to encode a
temporal index that being a number at most equal to the number of queries issued
by any PPT adversary, will be at most super-logarithmic, and thus can be encoded
with a string of poly-logarithmic size. For simplicity, henceforth, we will claim that
our constructions have tokens of constant size omitting to specify this detail.
3 Henceforth, we mean by non-adaptive queries the queries that the adversary asks
before seeing the challenge ciphertext and adaptive queries the queries the adversary
asks after seeing it.
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be a MI-FE over 2-inputs. Then, instead of encoding the slots (ri, zi)’s
in the ciphertext, we could add to the ciphertext a tag tagc (that is, the
encryption would consist of a ciphertext plus the tag in clear) such that
the simulator can program the RO on this point to output the values
(ri, zi)’s. Now the ciphertext would consist of only a short ciphertext ct
and the short tag tagc. At decryption time, we could “decompress“ tagc
to get some string y, encrypt it with the public-key of the of the MI-FE
scheme to produce ct2 and finally feed ct1 and ct2 to the multi-input
token. Then, the simulator could program the RO so to output the values
(ri, zi)’s on the point tagc. The functionality would be thus modified so
that, in trapdoor mode, the output would be taken by the values (ri, zi)’s
(specifically, choosing the values zi corresponding to the string ri in the
token). Therefore, any token applied to the simulated ciphertext (that is
in trapdoor mode) should decrypt the same output as the real ciphertext
would do.
This simple approach incurs more problems, the most serious being
that the adversary could feed the multi-input token with a different ci-
phertext that does not correspond to RO(tagc), thus detecting whether
the first ciphertext is in normal or trapdoor mode. In fact, notice that
in normal mode the second ciphertext does not affect the final output,
whereas in trapdoor mode, the output only depends on the second cipher-
text fed to the multi-input token. Another problem here is that RO(tagc)
should not contain the values (ri, zi)’s in clear, but this is easily solved by
letting RO(tagc) be an encryption of them and putting the corresponding
secret-key in the first ciphertext. So, the main technical problem is:
How can we force the adversary to feed the 2-inputs token with a
second ciphertext that encrypts RO(tagc)?
Note that in the case of FE schemes that support functionalities with
RO gates, this can be easily done by defining a new functionality that
first tests whether the second input equals RO(tagc), but in the “pure“
RO model this solution can not be applied. Our patch is to add a new
slot h of short size in the first ciphertext. Such value h is set to the hash
of RO(tagc) with respect to a Collision-Resistant Hash Function (CRHF)
Hash, i.e., h = Hash(RO(tagc)). Furthermore, we modify the transformed
functionality so that it first checks whether Hash(RO(tagc)) = h. If this
test fails, the functionality outputs an error ⊥. The intuition is that with
this modification, the adversary is now forced to use a second ciphertext
that encryptsRO(tagc) since otherwise it gets⊥ on both real or simulated
ciphertext, and so, under the IND-Security of the MI-FE scheme, it seems
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that the adversary can not tell apart a real ciphertext from a simulated
ciphertext. Unfortunately, we are not able to prove the security of this
transformation assuming only the standard notion of IND-Security for
MI-FE. In fact, notice that there exist second inputs for the modified
functionality that distinguish whether the first input has the flag set to
normal or trapdoor mode, namely inputs that correspond to collisions
of Hash with respect to h and RO(tagc). That is, any another second
ciphertext that encrypt a value y 6= RO(tagc) such that Hash(y) = h
allows to distinguish whether the first ciphertext is in normal or trapdoor
mode. Furthermore, it is not possible to make direct use of the security
of the CRHF. The problem is that the definition of (2-inputs) MI-FE
is too strong in that it requests the adversary to output two challenge
message pairs (x0, y) and (x1, y) such that for any function f for which
the adversary asked a query f(x0, ·) = f(x1, ·). In our case, this does not
hold: there exists a set of collisions C such that for any z ∈ C, Hash(z) = h
and f(x0, z) 6= f(x1, z). However, notice that it seems difficult for the
adversary to find such collisions.
Our assumptions and CRIND-Security. For these reasons, we need
to extend the notion of MI-FE to what we call collision-resistant indistin-
guishability (CRIND, in short)4. In Section 4 we provide an instantiation
of this primitive from extractability obfuscation w.r.t. distributional aux-
iliary input [14] (cf. Remark 3). We think that this definition can be of
independent interest since it is more tailored for the applicability of MI-
FE to other primitives. The reader may have noticed that the security of
the second ciphertext guaranteed by the underlying MI-FE is not neces-
sary. That is, our transformation would work even assuming 2-inputs MI-
FE systems that take the second input in clear. In fact, CRIND-Security
does not imply IND-Security for MI-FE schemes but this suffices for our
scopes.
Roughly speaking, in CRIND-Security the security is quantified only
with respect to valid adversaries5, where an adversary is considered valid
if it only submits challengesm0,m1 and asks a set of queriesK that satisfy
some “hardness“ property called collision-resistance compatibility, namely
that it is difficult to find a second input m2 such that F (k,m0,m2) 6=
F (k,m1,m2) for some k ∈ K. Since in the reductions to CRIND-Security
4 Maybe, a better name would have been “differing-inputs indistinguishability“ but we
do not adopt this name to not overlap with differing-inputs obfuscation and because
it recalls the reason to advocate this stronger notion for our transformations.
5 We can recast IND-Security in a similar way by defining valid adversaries that only
ask queries and challenges satisfying the compatibility property.
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it is not generally possible to directly check the hardness of (K,m0,m1),
the definition dictates (1) the existence of an efficient checker algorithm
that approves only (but possibly not all) valid triples (K,m0,m1) (i.e., the
checker can detect efficiently if a triple is collision-resistant compatible)
and (2) that an adversary is valid if it only asks triples approved by the
checker. We defer the details of the definition to Section 2.1.
Next, in a security reduction to CRIND-Security (i.e., when we need
to prove the indistinguishability of two hybrid experiments assuming the
CRIND-Security), the main task is to define an appropriate checker and
prove that triples that are not collision-resistant compatible are rejected
by it. This is usually done by checking that messages and keys satisfy an
appropriate format. For instance, in the above case, the checker will check
whether the machine (corresponding to the token) uses as sub-routine the
specified CRHF and that the challenge messages and such machine have
the right format. The construction of CRIND-Secure schemes follows the
lines of the construction of fully IND-Secure FE schemes of Boyle et al.
Namely, the encryption of the first input m1 will be an obfuscation of
a machine that has embedded m1 and a verification key for a signature
scheme and takes as input a signature of a machine M and a second
input m2 and (1) checks the validity of the signature and (2) if such test
passes outputs M(m1,m2). For the same resonas of Boyle et al. we need
to resort to functional signatures. Details along with a broader overview
can be found in Section 4.
The above presentation is an oversimplification and we defer the reader
to the Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for more details.
Our models and results. The reader may have noticed that the output
of RO has to be “big“, i.e., its size depends on the number of queries.
Of course, we could assume that its range has constant size and replace a
single invocation of the RO with range of size > q with many invocation
of a RO with range of constant size, but also in this case the running-time
of the encryption and decryption procedures would have to depend on the
number of queries. Here, it is the novelty of our approach. All the param-
eters of our SIM-Secure public-key FE scheme (including ciphertexts and
tokens) have constant size but the cost of the “expansion“ is moved from
the length of ciphertexts and tokens to the running-time of the encryp-
tion and decryption procedures. That is, our SIM-Secure public-key FE
scheme stills depends on q in the setup and running-time, but the size
of the ciphertexts and tokens is constant. The results we achieve can be
summarized as follows:
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– (q1, qc, poly)-SIM-Security with ciphertext of constant size and tokens
of size qc. That is, SIM-Security against adversaries asking bounded
non-adaptive token queries, bounded ciphertext queries, and unbounded
adaptive token queries. In this case the size of the ciphertexts is con-
stant but the size of the tokens grows as the number of ciphertext
queries (and thus is constant in the case of 1 ciphertext query). This
is known to be impossible in the standard model due to the impossi-
bility of Agrawal et al. [4] (precisely this impossibility does not rule
out the existence of schemes that satisfy this notion of security but
it rules out the existence of schemes that satisfy both this notion of
security and have short ciphertexts). Moreover, in this case the en-
cryption and decryption procedures have running-times depending on
q1.
– (q1, qc, q2)-SIM-Security with both ciphertexts and tokens of constant
size. That is, SIM-Security against adversaries asking bounded token
(both non-adaptive and adaptive) and ciphertext queries but with
both ciphertext and token of constant size. In the standard model this
is known to be impossible due to the impossibility result of De Caro
and Iovino [5] for SIM-Security against adversaries asking unbounded
ciphertext queries and bounded adaptive token queries (this impossi-
bility is essentially an adaptation of the impossibility of Agrawal et
al. [4]). In this case, the encryption and decryption procedures have
running-times depending on max{q1, qc, q2}.
– We show how to remove the afore-mentioned limitation in a variant
of the symmetric-key model where ciphertexts and tokens are tagged
with a timestamp that imposes an order on their generation (i.e., the
i-th token/ciphertext generated in the system is tagged with the value
i). This model is reasonable because in the symmetric-key setting, the
user that set-up the system is the same entity that generates tokens
and ciphertexts as well. 6 We defer the reader to Section 3.3 for more
details.
For the sake of providing constructions with optimal parameters we work
in the Turing Machine model of computation.7
6 The same considerations also hold in applications where many users share the same
secret-key. Indeed, in this case one needs to assume that such users trust each other,
and thus they will tag the ciphertexts and tokens with the correct timestamp.
7 The main focus of the work of Goldwasser et al. [13] is for the circuit model but they
sketch how to extend it to the Turing Machine model. Similar considerations hold
for the schemes of Gordon et al. [12]. Further details will be given in the Master’s
Thesis of the second author.
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The optimality and the soundness of our results. It is easy to see
that SIM-Security in the standard model but for schemes with procedures
of running-time dependent on the number of queries is impossible as well.
Moreover, we think that SIM-Security in the RO model with a constant
number of RO calls is impossible to achieve as well, though we were
not able to prove an impossibility result for it and leave to future work
to set positive or negative results. Anyway, one could object that if we
instantiate the RO with any concrete hash function, the resulting scheme
is not “SIM-Secure“ due to the impossibility results. This problem is also
shared with the constructions for the RO model of De Caro et al. [8] and
Boneh et al. [1]. What does it mean?
What the impossibility results say is that there are adversaries for
which there exists no simulator though we do not know any concrete at-
tacks on these schemes. This is different from the counter-examples of
Canetti et al. [15] where they were presented signature schemes provably
secure in the RO model but concretely insecure when instantiated with
any hash function. In our view, this could merely mean that general def-
initions of SIM-Security are too strong. Along this direction, the works
of De Caro and Iovino [5] and Agrawal et al. [6] provide another way to
overcome this limitation.
2 Definitions
Due to space constraints we defer to the full version [16] the definitions
of functional signature scheme, collision-resistant hash function, pseudo-
random function family, single and multi-inputs functional encryption
scheme.
2.1 Collision-Resistant Indistinguishability Security for MI-FE
As we mentioned in the construction overview sketched in Section 1, we
need a different notion of MI-FE security. Here, we consider only the 2-
inputs case, since this is suited for our main transformation but it is
straightforward to extend it to the n-ary case.
Furthermore, in Section 4 we will show how to construct a CRIND-
Secure MI-FE scheme from extractability obfuscation w.r.t. distributional
auxiliary input [14] (cf. Remark 3). We presented an informal discussion
of the definition in Section 1. We now present the formal definition.
The collision-resistant indistinguishability-based notion of security for
a multi-input functional encryption scheme MI-FE = (Setup,KeyGen,
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Enc,Eval) for functionality F defined over (K,M) is formalized by means
of the following experiment CRINDMI-FEA with an adversary A = (A0,A1).
Below, we present the definition for only one message; it is easy to see
the definition extends naturally for multiple messages.
CRINDMI-FEA (1λ)
1. (Mpk,Msk)← MI-FE.Setup(1λ);
2. r
R← {0, 1}λ;
3. (x0, x1, st)← AMI-FE.KeyGen(Msk,·)0 (Mpk, r) where we require that |x0| = |x1|;
4. b
R← {0, 1};
5. Ct1 ← MI-FE.Encrypt(Mpk, (xb||r));
6. b′ ← AMI-FE.KeyGen(Msk,·)1 (Mpk,Ct1, st);
7. Output: (b = b′).
We make the following additional requirements:
– Collision-resistance compatibility. Let K denote a set of keys. We say
that a pair of messages x0 and x1 is collision-resistant compatible
with K if it holds that: any (possibly, non-uniform) PPT algorithm
B given the security parameter 1λ and (r, x0, x1) for r uniformly dis-
tributed in {0, 1}λ, can find y satisfying inequality F (k, (x0||r), y) 6=
F (k, (x1||r), y) for some k ∈ K with at most negligible (in λ) prob-
ability, where probability is taken over r
R← {0, 1}λ and the random
coins of B.8
– Efficient checkability. We assume that there exist efficient checker al-
gorithm Checker, which takes as input (k, x0, x1) and outputs false
if x0 and x1 are not collision-resistant compatible with {k} (i.e., the
singleton set containing the key k).
– Validity. We say that an adversary A in the above game is valid with
respect to a checker Checker with efficient checkability if during the
execution of the above game, A outputs challenge messages x0 and
x1 of the same length and asks a set of queries K in the key space of
8 It can appear that the definition be not well-defined because we do not specify how
the key k is related to the security parameter. To understand this, you may imagine
that k be the code of some algorithm P (ant thus of constant-size) to compute a
keyed hash function Hash(·, ·). The program P takes an hashing key s computed with
respect to an arbitrarily long security parameter λ and an input x and computes
Hash(s, x). Therefore in the above definition, k (along with the functionality F )
plays the role of P and thus can have constant size whereas r plays the role of the
hashing key s that depends instead on the security parameter.
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the functionality such that for any k ∈ K, Checker(k, x0, x1) = true
(i.e., the adversary only asks queries and challenges approved by the
checker).
The advantage of a valid adversary A in the above game is defined as
AdvMI-FE,INDA (1
λ) = |Prob[CRINDMI-FEA (1λ) = 1]− 1/2|.
Definition 1 We say that a 2-inputs MI-FE scheme is collision-resistant
indistinguishably secure (CRIND-Secure, in short) if for any checker Checker
satisfying efficient checkability, it holds that all PPT adversaries A valid
with respect to Checker have at most negligible advantage in the above
game.
2.2 Extractability obfuscation w.r.t. distributional auxiliary
input
Boyl et al. [14] defined obfuscators secure against general distributional
auxiliary input. We recall their definition (cf. Remark 3).
Definition 2 A uniform PPT machine eO is an extractability obfusca-
tor w.r.t. (general) distributional auiliary input for the class of Turing
Machines {Mλ}λ∈N if it satisfies the following properties:
– (Correctness): For all security parameter λ, all M ∈M, all inputs x,
we have
Pr
[
M ′ ← eO(1λ,M) : M ′(x) = M(x)
]
= 1.
– (Polynomial slowdown): There exist a universal polynomial p such
that for any machineM , we have |M ′| ≤ p(|M |) for allM ′ = eO(1λ,M)
under all random coins.
– (Security): For every non-uniform PPT adversary A, any polynomial
p(λ), and efficiently sampleable distribution D overMλ×Mλ×{0, 1}?,
there exists a non-uniform PPT extractor E and polynomial q(λ) and
negligible function negl(λ) such that, for every λ ∈ N, with probability
≥ 1− negl(λ) over (M0,M1, z)← D(1λ), it holds that:
If Pr
[
b
R← {0, 1};M ′ ← eO(1λ,Mb) : A(1λ,M ′,M0,M1, z) = b
]
≥ 12+
1
p(λ) ,
then Pr
[
w ← E(1λ,M0,M1, z) : M0(w) 6= M1(w)
] ≥ 1q(λ)
Remark 3 In light of the recent “implausibility“ results on extractability
obfuscation with auxiliary input [17, 18], we would like to point out that
our results are based on specific distributions for which no implausibility
result is known. Same considerations were also made in [14].
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3 Our Transformations
3.1 (q1, qc, poly)-SIM-Security
In this section, we show that assuming a CRIND-Secure (in the standard
model) MI-FE scheme for p-TM2 (2-inputs Turing machines with run time
equal to a polynomial p) for any polynomial p, it is possible to construct
a SIM-Secure functional encryption scheme in the RO model for function-
ality p-TM for any polynomial p. Moreover, this is possible also for FE
schemes with input-specific run time. The resulting scheme is secure for
a bounded number of messages and non-adaptive token queries, and un-
bounded number of adaptive key queries. Moreover, it enjoys ciphertexts
and tokens of size not growing with the number of non-adaptive queries,
overcoming the impossibility result of Agrawal et al. [4] for the standard
model. In Section 4 we will show how to construct a CRIND-Secure MI-FE
from extractability obfuscation w.r.t. distributional auxiliary input [14]
(cf. Remark 3).
Trapdoor Machines The idea of our transformations is to replace the
original machine with a “trapdoor” one that the simulator can use to
program the output in some way. This approach is inspired by the FLS
paradigm introduced by Feige, Lapidot and Shamir [19] to obtain zero-
knowledge proof systems from witness indistinguishable proof systems.
Below we present the construction of trapdoor machine, which works in
standard model.
Definition 4 [Trapdoor Machine] Fix q > 0. Let M be a Turing ma-
chine with one input. Let SE = (SE.Enc,SE.Dec) be a symmetric-key
encryption scheme with key-space {0, 1}λ, message-space {0, 1}λ+1, and
ciphertext-space {0, 1}ν . We require for simplicity that SE has pseudo-
random ciphertexts (see the full version [16]) and can encrypt messages
of variable length (at most λ+ 1). Let Hash : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}q·ν → {0, 1}λ
be a collision resistant hash function 9. For tagk = (idk, c) ∈ {0, 1}λ+ν
define the corresponding trapdoor machine Trap[M,Hash,SE]tagk on two
inputs as follows:
9 For sake of simplicity as Hash key we will use a random string of length λ, instead
of key generated by Gen. Alternatively, we could feed the Gen algorithm with this
randomness.
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Machine Trap[M,Hash,SE]tagk(m′, R)
(m, flag, sk, h, kH)← m′
If Hash(kH, R) 6= h then return ⊥
If flag = 0 then return M(m)
(idk, c)← tagk
(R1, . . . , Rq)← R
For i = 1, . . . , q do
(idk
′, v)← SE.Dec(sk,Ri)
If idk
′ = idk then return v
return SE.Dec(sk, c)
RO-based Transformation
Overview. In Section 1 we sketched a simplified version of our transforma-
tion. Here, we present an overview with more details. The idea is to put
additional “slots” in the plaintexts and secret keys that will only be used
by the simulator. A plaintext contains five slots and a secret key contains
two slots. In the plaintext, the first slot is the actual message m. The
second slot is a bit flag indicating whether the ciphertext is in trapdoor
mode. The third slot is a random key sk used by SE scheme, the fourth
slot is a hash h of RO(tagc) (computed with respect to a CRHF) attached
to the ciphertext and finally the fifth slot contains a hash function key
kH.
In the secret key, the first slot encodes the actual machine M and the
second slot is a random tag tagk = (idk, c). Slot idk is used by simulator
to identify pre-challenge tokens and c is used to convey programmed out-
put value in post-challenge tokens. For evaluation, if the ciphertext is not
in trapdoor mode (i.e., flag = 0) then the functionality simply evaluates
the original machine M of the message m. If the ciphertext is in trap-
door mode, depending on the nature of the secret key (non-adaptive or
adaptive), for tagk = (idk, c), if for some i ∈ [q], (idk, v) = SE.Dec(sk,Ri),
then the functionality outputs v, otherwise it outputs SE.Dec(sk, c). Here
Ri is the i-th element in the string R that the machine takes as second
input, and is set by the (honest) evaluation procedure to RO(tagc).
For sake of simplicity we assume that TM functionality, for which our
scheme is constructed, has output space {0, 1}. The construction can be
easily extended to work for any TM functionality with bounded output
length.
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Definition 5 [RO-Based Transformation] Let p(·) be any polynomial.
Let SE = (SE.Enc, SE.Dec) be a symmetric-key encryption scheme with
key-space {0, 1}λ, message-space {0, 1}λ+1, and ciphertext-space {0, 1}ν .
We require for simplicity that SE has pseudo-random ciphertexts (see the
full version [16]) and can encrypt messages of variable length (at most
λ+1). Let Hash : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}q·ν → {0, 1}λ be a collision-resistant hash
function (not modeled as a random oracle). Assuming that the running
time of machine M equals exactly p(|m|) on input m, the running time of
trapdoor machine Trap[M,Hash, SE]tagk is bounded by some polynomial
p′(·). Let MI-FE = (MI-FE.Setup,MI-FE.Enc,MI-FE.KeyGen,MI-FE.Eval)
be a multi-input functional encryption scheme for the functionality p′-
TM2.
In our construction we assume that the output length of the pro-
grammable random oracle RO equals q · ν.
We define a new (single-input) functional encryption scheme
SimFE[Hash,SE] = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Eval) for functionality p-TM as
follows.
– Setup(1λ): runs (Mpk,Msk) ← MI-FE.Setup(1λ) and chooses random
r
R← {0, 1}λ and returns a pair (Mpk, r) as public key Pk and Msk as
master secret key.
– Enc(Pk,m): on input Pk = (Ek1,Ek2, r) and m ∈ {0, 1}∗, the algo-
rithm chooses random sk
R← {0, 1}λ, tagc R← {0, 1}λ and sets kH = r,
then it takes m′ = (m, 0, sk,Hash(kH,RO(tagc), kH), computes c ←
MI-FE.Enc(Ek1,m
′) and returns a pair (c, tagc) as its own output.
– KeyGen(Msk,M): on input Msk and a machine M , the algorithm
chooses random idk
R← {0, 1}λ, c R← {0, 1}νand returns (Tok, tagk)
where
Tok← MI-FE.KeyGen(Msk,Trap[M,Hash,SE]tagk) and tagk = (idk, c).
– Eval(Pk,Ct, Tok): on input Pk = (Ek1,Ek2, r), Ct = (c, tagc) and Tok =
(Tok′, tagk), computes c′ = MI-FE.Enc(Ek2,RO(tagc)) and returns the
output MI-FE.Eval(Tok′, c, c′).
Theorem 6 Suppose MI-FE is CRIND-Secure in the standard model.
Then SimFE is (q, 1, poly)-SIM-Secure in the random oracle model. Fur-
thermore, this can be extended to (q1, qc, poly)-SIM-Security (see the full
version [16]) and if MI-FE satisfies the properties of succinctness and
input-specific time, so SimFE does.
Security proof overview. We conduct the security proof of our construc-
tion by a standard hybrid argument. To move from real world experiment
to ideal one we use the following hybrid experiments:
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– The first hybrid experiment corresponds to the real experiment.
– The second hybrid experiment is identical to the previous one except
that the random oracle is programmed at point tagc so to output the
encryption of the desired output values on pre-challenge queries, and
post-challenge queries are answered with tokens that have embedded
appropriate encrypted output values. Moreover, all these values are
encrypted using the underlying SE scheme with a randomly chosen
secret-key sk′. Notice that in this experiment the secret-key sk′ is
uncorrelated to the secret-key sk embedded in ciphertext.
– The third hybrid experiment is identical to the previous one except
that the ciphertext contains the same secret-key sk′ used to program
the RO.
– In last step we switch the flag slot in the ciphertext to 1 indicating the
trapdoor mode. At the same time we change the content of message
slot m to 0|m|. This is necessary due to the fact that simulator only
knows the challenge message length, but not the message itself.
One can reduce the security of first two transitions to the ciphertext
pseudo-randomness of SE scheme and to the CRIND-Security of underly-
ing MI-FE scheme. The proof in these cases is pretty straightforward.
One could be tempted to reduce the indistinguishability security of
last two hybrids to both collision resistance of used hash function and
IND-Security on MI-FE. However, the security reduction is not obvious.
The adversary could recognize the simulation by finding a string R dif-
ferent from RO(tagc) for which Hash(kH, R) = Hash(kH,RO(tagc)), and
applying the evaluation algorithm to this value as second input. The out-
put of evaluation algorithm in this case would be different than expected.
Although the adversary would contradict the collision resistance of Hash,
we are not able to construct algorithm based on that adversary, which
breaks the hash function security.
Therefore we need to rely on the CRIND-Security of MI-FE. Moreover,
for completeness we will only assume CRIND-Security and never IND-
Security.
We defer the proof of Theorem 6 to the full version [16].
3.2 (q1, qc, q2)-SIM-Security with short tokens
The previous transformation suffers from the problem that the size of the
tokens grows as the number of ciphertext queries qc. In this Section we
show how to achieve (q1, qc, q2)-SIM-Security. Notice that in the standard
model constructions satisfying this level of security like the scheme of
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Gorbunov et al. [20] have short ciphertexts and tokens. Moreover, De
Caro and Iovino [5] showed an impossibility result for this setting. Our
transformation assumes a 3-inputs MI-FE scheme (CRIND-Secure in the
standard model). The resulting scheme is (q1, qc, q2)-SIM-Secure according
to the definition with simulated setup (see the full version [16]). The idea
is very similar to the transformation presented in Section 3.1, but due to
space constraints, we defer the sketch of the transformation to the full
version [16].
3.3 (poly, poly, poly)-SIM-Security in the Timestamp model
We recall that any known impossibility results in the standard model
also apply to the symmetric-key setting. In this Section we show how
to achieve unbounded SIM-Security in the RO model in a variant of the
symmetric-key setting that we call the timestamp model. Moreover, our
scheme enjoys ciphertexts and tokens of constant size. The timestamp
model is identical to the symmetric-key mode except for the following
changes:
– The encryption and key generation procedures also take as input a
temporal index or timestamp. The security of this index is not required.
The security experiments are identical to those of the symmetric-key
model except that the queries are answered by providing tokens and
ciphertexts with increasing temporal index (the exact value does not
matter as long as they are ordered in order of invocation). Roughly
speaking, this is equivalent to saying that the procedures are stateful.
Notice that in the symmetric-key model, this change has no cost since
the user who set-up the system can keep the value of the current
timestamp and guarantee that ciphertexts and tokens are generated
with timestamps of increasing order.
– For simplicity, we also assume that there is a decryption key. Precisely,
the evaluation algorithm takes as input a token, a ciphertext and
a decryption key. It is easy to see that this decryption key can be
removed at the cost of including it in any token or ciphertext.
Sketch of the transformation. With these changes in mind it is easy to
modify the scheme of Section 3.2 to satisfy (poly, poly, poly)-SIM-Security
in the RO model. Precisely, the slots for the identifiers will contain the
temporal index in clear10. In the scheme, the tags will be such that the
10 We stress that we could also assume that the temporal index is appended in clear
to the final ciphertext.
16 Vincenzo Iovino and Karol Z˙ebroski
(both non-programmed and programmed) RO on these input will output
a string of size proportional to i, where i is the temporal index. This
can be done by assuming that the RO outputs a single bit and invoking
it many times. That is, instead of computing RO(tagc), the procedures
will compute RO(tagc||j) for j = 1, . . . ,m where m is the needed size.
For simplicity, henceforth, we assume that the RO outputs strings of
variable-length. As byproduct, we need to program the RO on the tag
tagc (resp. tagk) of a ciphertext (resp. token) with timestamp i to only
output i ciphertexts. Thus, we do not need to fix in advance any bound,
which was the only limitation of the previous transformations. Notice that
the evaluation algorithm needs to encrypt the output of RO(tagc) and
RO(tagk) and this is done by using the encryption keys Ek2 and Ek3 for
the second and third input. This is the reason why we assume that there
is a decryption key that in this scheme consists of the pair (Ek2,Ek3).
Security. The security proof is identical to that of the transformation
of Section 3.2 with further simplifications due to the fact that we do not
need to have the temporal index encrypted. We first need to switch the
slot of the identifiers in both ciphertext and tokens to be encryption of
the the temporal index. Then the proof proceeds as before.
4 Constructions of CRIND-Secure MI-FE from eO
Overview of the construction and security reduction. In order to achieve
CRIND-security of MI-FE (as defined in Section 2.1), we make use of
the following ideas inspired by the construction of fully IND-Secure FE
of Boyle et al. [14]. We assume a functional signature scheme FS [21].
Namely, our encryption procedure takes as input the first input m1 and
produces an obfuscation of a machine that has embedded m1 and takes
as input a second message m2 and a functional signature for some func-
tion f and (1) verifies the signature and (2) outputs f(m1,m2). Roughly
speaking, we want prevent the adversary to be able to find distinguishing
inputs. To this scope, we need to forbid the adversary from evaluating the
machine on functions for which it did not see a signature. For the same
reasons as in Boyle et al. it is not possible to use a standard signature
scheme. This is because, the adversary A against eO needs to produce
a view to the adversary B against CRIND-Security, and in particular to
simulate the post-challenge tokens. To that aim, A would need to receive
an auxiliary input z containing the signing key of the traditional signa-
ture scheme but in this case an extractor with access to z could easily
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find a distinguishing input. As in Boyle et al. we resort to functional
signatures. We recall their ideas. In the scheme, they put a functional
signing key that allows to sign any function. In the security proof, they
use the property of function privacy to show that the original experiment
is computationally indistinguishable to an experiment where the post-
challenge queries are answered with respect to a restricted signing key for
the Boolean predicate that is verified on all and only the machines T for
which T (m0) = T (m1), where m0 and m1 are the challenges chosen by
the adversary against IND-Security. Thus, putting this restricted signing
key in the auxiliary distribution does not hurt of the security since an
extractor can not make use of it to find a distinguishing input. In the
case of CRIND-Security, it is not longer true that T (m0) = T (m1) but we
will invoke the properties of the checker and we set the Boolean predicate
to one that is verified for all machines T approved by the checker with
respect to the challenges, i.e., such that Checker(T,m0,m1) = 1. Then,
by the property of the checker and valid adversaries, it follows that for
any machine T for which the valid adversary asked a query, it is difficult
to find a second input m2 such that T (m0,m2) 6= T (m1,m2). Thus, the
existence of an extractor for our distribution would contradict the hy-
pothesis that the adversary is valid and only asked queries for machines
and challenges satisfying the collision-resistance compatibility. Precisely,
we have the following transformation.
Definition 7 [eO-Based Transformation]
Let eO be an extractability obfuscator w.r.t. distributional auxiliary input
(cf. Remark 3). Let FS = (FS.Setup,FS.KeyGen,FS.Sign,FS.Verify) be a
signature scheme.
For any message m1 and verification key vk of FS, let us define a
machine Mm1 (where for simplicity we omit the other parameters in sub-
script) that takes two inputs, a signature σT of machine T and a message
m2, and (1) the machine verifies the signature σT according to vk, and
if it is an invalid signature, it returns ⊥; and (2) the machine returns
T (m1,m2).
We define a new 2-inputs functional encryption scheme
CRFE[eO,FS] = (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Eval) for functionality TM2 as fol-
lows11
11 For simplicity, henceforth we omit to specify whether the functionality is with respect
to machine of fixed time or input-specific. Both cases can be taken in account with
small changes.
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– Setup(1λ): chooses a pair (msk, vk) ← FS.Setup(1λ) and generates a
key sk1 ← FS.KeyGen(msk, 1) that allows signing all messages (i.e., for
the always-accepting predicate 1(T ) = T ∀ T ). It sets Ek1 = Ek2 = vk
and outputs Mpk = Ek1 and Msk = (sk1, vk).
– Enc(Ek,m): depending on whether Ek is an encryption key for first or
second input:
• if Ek = Ek1 then outputs eO(Mm) where Mm is defined as above
with respect to m and vk (recall that for simiplicity we omit the
subscript for vk).
• if Ek = Ek2 then outputs the message m in clear (recall that we are
not interested in the security of the second input and we adopted
the formalism of multi-input FE to avoid the need of a new syntax
and for sake of generality, e.g., providing in future constructions
that satisfy both IND-Security and CRIND-Security).
– KeyGen(Msk, T ): on input Msk = (sk1, vk) and a machine T , the algo-
rithm generates a signature on T via σT ← Signature.Sign(sk1,T) and
outputs token σT .
– Eval(Mpk,Ct1,Ct2, Tok): on input Mpk = vk, Ct1 which is an obfus-
cated machine M of machine Mm1 , Ct2 = m2, Tok = σT , runs machine
M with the other inputs as arguments, and returns the machine out-
put as its own.
Correctness. It is easy to see that the scheme satisfies correctness as-
suming the correctness of eO and FS.
We now state the security of the constructed scheme.
Theorem 8 If eO is an extractable obfuscator w.r.t. distributional auxil-
iary input, FS is an unforgeable functional signature scheme with function
privacy, then, for any Checker satisfying the requirement of the CRIND-
Security, it holds that CRFE[eO,FS] is CRIND-Secure. Furthermore such
scheme satisfies input-specific run time and assuming that FS is also suc-
cinct, so CRFE does.
Due to space constraints, we defer the formal proof of the theorem to
Appendix A.
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A Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. We define the following hybrids. Let q(λ) be a bound on the num-
ber of post-challenge token queries asked by B in any execution with
security parameter 1λ. Such bound exists because B is a PPT algorithm.
– Hybrid HB0 : This is the real experiment CRIND
CRFE[eO,FS]
B .
– Hybrid HBi , i = 0, . . . , q : Same as the previous hybrid, except that
the first i post-challenge token queries are answered with respect to a
restricted signing key skC for the Boolean predicate C that allows one
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to sign exactly Turing machines T for which Checker(T,m0,m1) = 1.
(This is one of the differences with the proof of Boyle et al. wherein,
being the scope to prove IND-Security, the signing key is for a predi-
cate that allows one to sign exactly the machines T for which T (m0) =
T (m1). This is not possible in our case, but we make use of the def-
inition of valid adversary that dictates that such adversary will only
make queries for machines approved by the checker.). Specifically, at
the beginning of the game the challenger generates a restricted signing
key skC ← FS.KeyGen(Msk,C). The pre-challenge queries are answered
using the standard signing key sk1 as in hybrid H0. The first i post-
challenge token queries are answered using the restricted key skC, that
is a token query for machine T is answered with σT ← FS.Sign(skC,T).
All remaining token queries are anwered using the standard key sk1.
Claim 9 For i = 1, . . . , q, the advantage of B in guessing the bit b in
hybrid HBi is equal to the advantage of B in guessing the bit b in hybrid
HBi−1 up to a negligible factor.
We prove the claim by using the function privacy property of FS. Namely,
for any i ∈ [q], consider the following adversary Apriv(1λ) against function
privacy of FS.
– Aipriv is given keys (vk,msk)← FS.Setup(1λ) from the function privacy
challenger.
– Aipriv submits the all-accepting function 1 as the first of its two chal-
lenge functions, and receives a corresponding signing key sk1 ←
FS.KeyGen(msk, 1).
– Aipriv simulates interaction with B. First, it forwards vk to B as the
public-key and chooses a random string r ∈ {0, 1}λ. For each token
query T made by B, it generates a signature on T using key sk1.
– Aipriv At some point B outputs a pair of messages m0,m1. Aipriv gener-
ates a challenge ciphertext in the CRIND-Security game by sampling
a random bit b and encrypting (mb||r) and sending it to B.
– Aipriv submits as its second challenge function C (as defined above). It
receives a corresponding signing key skC ← FS.KeyGen(msk,PC).
– Aipriv now simulates interaction with B as follows.
For the first i − 1 post-challenge token queries T made by B, Aipriv
generates a signature using key skC, i.e., σT ← FS.Sign(skC,T). For B’s
i-th post-challenge query, Aipriv submits the pair of preimages (T, T )
to the function privacy challenger (note that 1(T ) = C(T ) = T )
since, being B a valid adversary, it only asks queries T such that
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Checker(T,m0,m1) = 1), and receives a signature σT generated either
using key sk1 or key skC. Aipriv generates the remaining post-challenge
queries of B using key sk1.
– Eventually B outputs a bit b′. If b′ = b is a correct guess, then Aipriv
outputs function 1; otherwise, it outputs function C.
Note that if the function privacy challenger selected the function 1,
then Aipriv perfectly simulates hybrid HBi−1, otherwise it perfectly simu-
lates hybrid HBi . Thus, the advantage of Aipriv is exactly the difference in
guessing the bit b in the two hybrids, HBi and H
B
i−1 and the claim follows
from the function privacy property.
Next, we define the following distribution D depending on B.
– D(1λ) gets r R← {0, 1}λ, samples a key pair (vk,msk ← FS.Setup(1λ)
and generates the signing key for the all-accepting function 1 by sk1 ←
FS.KeyGen(msk, 1).
– Using sk1 and vk, D simulates the action of B in experiment HBq up
to the point in which B outputs a pair of challenge messages m1,m1.
Denote by viewB the current view of B up to this point of the simula-
tion.
– D generates a signing key skC for the function C as defined above and
machines Mm0||r and Mm1||r as defined above (recall that as usual we
omit to specify the subscript relative to vk).
– D outputs the tuple (Mm0||r,Mm1||r, z = (viewB, skC)).
We now can construct an adversary A(1λ,M ′,M0,M1, z) against the
security of eO.
– A takes as input the security parameter 1λ, an obfuscation M ′ of
machine Mb for randomly chosen bit b, two machines M0 and M1,
and auxiliary input z = (viewB, skC).
– Using viewB, A returns B to the state of execution as in the corre-
sponding earlier simulation during the D sampling process.
– Simulate the challenge ciphertex to B as M ′. For each subsequent
token query M made by B, A answers it by producing a signature on
M using skC.
– Eventually, B outputs a bit b′ for the challenge ciphertext that A
returns as its own guess.
Note that the interaction with the adversary B in sampling from D is
precisely a simulation in hybrid HBq up to the point in which B outputs
the challenge messages,and the interaction with B made by A is precisely
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a simulation of the remaining steps in hybrid HBq . We are assuming that
the advantage of B in hybrid H iq is ≥ 2a(λ) for some non-negligible func-
tion a(λ). This implies that there is a polynomial p(λ) such that for an
infinite set S of values λ, it holds that the advantage of B in hybrid H iq
for parameter λ is greater than 1/2p(λ). Thus, by an averaging argument,
for all λ ∈ S, A’s advantage (with respect to λ) in guessing the bit b on
which it is challenged upon is greater than 1/p with probability greater
than 1/p over the output of D. By the security of eO this implies a cor-
responding PPT extractor E and polynomial q(λ) and negligible function
negl(λ) such for all λ ∈ S, with probability 1 − negl(λ) over the output
(M0,M1, z) of D, it holds that:
if Pr
[
b
R← {0, 1};M ′ ← eO(1λ,Mb) : A(1λ,M ′,M0,M1, z) = b
]
≥ 12+ 1p(λ) ,
then Pr
[
w ← E(1λ,M0,M1, z) : M0(w) 6= M1(w)
] ≥ 1/q(λ). This im-
plies that for an infinite number of values λ, with probability ≥ 1/p(λ)−
negl(λ) over the output (M0,M1, z) of D, it holds that
Pr
[
w ← E(1λ,M0,M1, z) : M0(w) 6= M1(w)
] ≥ 1/q(λ).
We now show that such PPT extractor can not exist.
Claim 10 There can not exist a PPT extractor as above.
Suppose toward a contradiction that there exists such extractor that out-
puts a signature σA for some machine A , and a second input m2 that dis-
tinguishes Mm0||r from Mm1||r. We note that any signature output by the
extractor must be a valid signature for a machine A for which the adver-
sary asked a query. This follows from the unforgeability of FS. From this
fact, and from the fact that the checker approved the triple (A,m0,m1),
it follows that m0 and m1 are collision-resistant compatible with {A}.
Therefore, this adversary can be used to break the collision-resistance
compatibility with respect to m0 and m1 and {A}, contradicting the hy-
pothesis.
It is trivial to see that the claim on input-specific run time holds if the
the scheme is used with Turing machines of input-specific run time and
that the claim on the succinctness follows easily from our construction
and the succinctness of FS. This concludes the proof.
